Some states treat a same-sex marriage as legally equal to a marriage between a man and a woman. Other states prohibit legal recognition of same-sex marriages in their constitutions. In every state that has a constitutional restriction against same-sex marriage, the amendment was passed by a popular vote.
In this article, we examine why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same-sex marriages. We begin by noting that direct democracy has been used to pass all current state-level constitutional restrictions on such marriages. In every state except Delaware, citizens are empowered to participate in the amendment process in this way.
When direct democracy is used to make laws, there exists substantial evidence that policy outcomes better reflect mass preferences (see Matsusaka 2004 Matsusaka , 2007 for comprehensive studies of this topic). Moreover, a comprehensive study of state legislatures reveals that they act in ways that are generally responsive to variances in public opinion across states (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) . Collectively, such studies support the view that the constitutional treatments of same-sex marriage differ across states because the citizens of constitutionally restrictive states have different attitudes about same-sex marriage than do citizens in constitutionally permissive states (see, e.g., Gamble 1997 , Riggle, Thomas, and Rostosky 2005 , Silver 2009 ).
We have a different view. It is not that attitudes are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes.
It is that the relationship between attitudes and outcomes is weaker than the conventional view suggests. This relationship is also weaker than a plausible alternative.
Our conclusions arise from the fact that states differ substantially in their requirements for constitutional change. Some states require little more than the assent of a majority of voters.
Other states impose far higher barriers. In this paper, we show how specific institutional attributes condition the relationship between citizen attitudes about same sex-marriage and constitutional outcomes.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we use state-level polls to document how citizen attitudes about same-sex marriage relate to its constitutional status. We use this data to characterize the attitude-amendment relationship and to establish a baseline against which we can compare other explanations. Our initial finding is that the relationship between attitudes and amendments is not as strong as the conventional wisdom suggests. For example, attitudes in many constitutionally restrictive states mirror attitudes in many constitutionally permissive states.
Second, we conduct a parallel analysis using a different factor: institutional variations.
These institutional variations are based on one of two decisions that a state made decades or centuries before same-sex marriage debates emerged. Since these institutional decisions were made so long ago, they could not have been caused by current attitudes on same-sex marriage.
Hence, they are exogenous to the attitudes-amendment relationship and can provide an alternate basis for explaining contemporary constitutional outcomes.
The first institutional decision is whether or not the state permits citizens to place potential constitutional amendments on the ballot without legislative participation. The second institutional decision, for states that require legislative participation, is whether a single vote of a legislative majority along with the support of a simple voter majority is sufficient to amend the constitution. We find that simply categorizing states by these two institutional decisions better predicts the current constitutional status of same-sex couples than attitudes alone.
Institutions, however, do not act as independent force on constitutional outcomes. Instead, they condition the relationship between attitudes and amendments in specific ways. Thus, when states make different institutional choices, we should systematic variance in attitudeamendment relationships across states.
Hence, our third analytic step entails the development of a threshold model that takes simultaneous account of voter attitudes and institutional specifics. We find that state-level differences in the constitutional status of same sex marriages are better explained by an approach that explicitly integrates how institutions influence the relationship between attitudes and amendments into its logic. An implication of this analysis is that many states are constitutionally permissive of same-sex marriages today not because their citizens are "socially progressive," but because their constitutions are difficult to amend.
We end the paper with an assessment of the future of same-sex politics in state constitutions. We describe why we expect relatively few states to adopt new constitutional restrictions against same sex marriage. We also use our analysis to clarify the likely next strategies of people who wish to leverage anti-gay sentiment for constitutional change and of people who wish to undo recently passed constitutional restrictions against same-sex marriage.
In all such cases, assessing how and where such strategies will succeed requires knowledge of how institutions condition the relationship between voter attitudes and constitutional outcomes.
Do Amendments Follow Attitudes?
We begin by evaluating the hypothesis that amendments follow attitudes or, putting matters more precisely, that state-level constitutional outcomes follow state-level public opinion variations. Our dependent variable is whether or not a state constitutional amendment prohibits same-sex couples from receiving the same legal treatment as married heterosexual couples. To evaluate this hypothesis, we gathered state-level opinion data for the 47 states from which we could acquire comparable data on the topic of same-sex marriage. 2 The states for which we 2 Most of our data come from polls commissioned by high-circulation newspapers. In six cases, the data came from other sources. Our California data is from a poll conducted by the Public To permit comparability among polls, we searched for consistently-worded questions.
We converged on two types: (1) questions that ask respondents whether they support or oppose a state constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman and (2) questions that ask whether the respondent favors or opposes gay marriage in general. 4 Other questions, such as those inquiring about civil unions, were not sufficiently prevalent in state polls to be included in our analysis. We found no systematic relationship between question type and the percent of respondents opposed to same-sex marriage generally or a specific amendment.
Therefore, we pool the two question types in our analyses. proportion of people opposing same-sex marriage and the proportion of people supporting an amendment as the proportion of people who oppose same-sex marriage. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between state-level attitudes and constitutional outcomes for the 47 states. States are ordered by their attitudes about same-sex marriage. On the left side of the figure are states whose attitudes towards same-sex couples are more permissive. On the right side are states whose attitudes are more restrictive. We draw a horizontal line at the 50% level.
Bars that stretch above this line are states in which a majority of citizens express restrictive attitudes.
The color of each bar reflects the current constitutional status of same-sex marriages.
Green bars represent states that have passed restrictive amendments. Blue bars represent states with no such amendments. If amendments follow attitudes, there should be blue bars on the left and green bars on the right of Figure 1 . There should be no mixing of colors in the middle.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.] Figure 1 shows that the relationship between amendments and attitudes is not as strong as the conventional wisdom suggests. At the extreme edges of the figure, the conventional wisdom performs well. For example, only 3 of the 10 states with the lowest levels of opposition have passed restrictive amendments, while 9 of 10 states with the highest levels of opposition have done so. But there is substantial mixing of colors in the middle.
Another way to evaluate the conventional wisdom is as follows: treat "majority rule" as a 6 An alternative hypothesis is that our classification of constitutional outcomes into the category of having or not having a restrictive amendment masks important differences in the content of constitutional restrictions. To evaluate this alternative, we used Lambda Legal (LL)'s categorization of constitutional outcomes. LL places every US state into one of five classes. Its "lowest class" contains states that have "inequality written into the constitution." Its "fourth class" includes states that have non-constitutional restrictions. The average percentage of opinion against same-sex marriages is 55% in the 10 LL fourth class states for which we have data and is 59% in the 26 LL lowest class states for which we have data. This difference is neither large nor statistically significant. Within the "lowest class" states, LL makes a further distinction between constitutional restrictions that have "not provided protections to reduce the harm" and constitutional restrictions that "might be read to cause even more harm." In the six "no protection" states for which we have data, the average percentage of opinion against same-sex marriage is 56%. In the 20 "might be read" states, the average is 60%. This difference is also not statistically significant. 7 We classify Illinois as a non-DCI state. In Illinois, DCIs are possible, but only for changes to Article IV of its constitution, whose scope is limited to the functioning of the legislature. So, any amendment to the Illinois constitution that pertains specifically to the legal status of same-sex couples would have to originate in the legislature. 8 Unlike political parties that live on to fight multiple policy battles, many amendment-oriented groups disband soon after the election in which their proposal is considered (Boehmke 2005) . Also noteworthy is the fact that many of the people who participate in writing the draft, paying the firm, or collecting the signatures need not be residents of the state (Bowler, Donovan, and Fernandez 1996) . 
Analysis
To what extent are present-day constitutional outcomes on same sex marriage related to these two procedural variables? From the procedural information just given, we can articulate a simple "amendments follow procedures" hypothesis. It has two parts:
1. Since non-DCI states have the extra burden of achieving a legislative coalition before placing an amendment on the ballot, DCI states are more likely than non-DCI states to have restrictive amendments. 10 9 The modal supermajority Election Day requirement in complex states is a majority of all votes cast. To see how this requirement works, suppose that 1,000,000 people vote in an election in a state that has the modal supermajority voting requirement. Suppose, moreover, that only 800,000 cast a vote for or against the amendment. In this case, the amendment must get 500,001 votes (a majority of all votes cast) to pass. 10 Implicit in this presentation is the assumption that if a restrictive amendment is placed on the ballot, it can gain a majority of votes on Election Day even if pre-election polls show a majority opposed to the election. Besides the observation that such an outcome has now occurred in every state that has put an amendment on the ballot, other factors support the validity of this assumption. One factor is social desirability in polls. Goldman (2008) , for example, has identified a segment of the population that is both reticent to admit to an interviewer that they oppose gay marriage but quite likely to support a restrictive amendment in the privacy of a 2.
Since changing the constitution in complex states requires broader legislative and/or voter support than in simple states, simple states are more likely than complex states to have restrictive amendments.
How well does this hypothesis correspond to current outcomes? With respect to the first part of the hypothesis, the public has voted to constitutionally restrict same-sex marriages in all fifteen DCI states. The same is not true in non-DCI states. The pattern in non-DCI states, however, is consistent with the hypothesis' second part. Ten of the nineteen simple non-DCI states (53%) have restrictive amendments. Only five out of sixteen (31%) complex non-DCI states have such restrictions. Hence, a crude version of the hypothesis that reads, "simple and DCI states will have restrictions, complex states will not" explains current constitutional outcomes in 36 of 50 states (72%). This crude hypothesis performs at least as well as the "amendments follow attitudes" hypothesis.
Is the observed relationship between constitutional outcomes and procedural variations illusory? Perhaps citizens of DCI states are more opposed to same-sex marriage than citizens of non-DCI states. It could also be the case that citizens of simple non-DCI states are more opposed to same-sex marriage than citizens of complex non-DCI states. [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] voting booth. A second factor is evidence that it is easier to motivate people who are opposed to same-sex marriage to go to the polls to defend their point of view than it is to motivate people who support equal marriage rights (see, e.g., Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith 2008) . 
Integrating Institutions and Attitudes: A Threshold Model of Constitutional Change
The previous section suggests that knowing whether or not a state allows direct constitutional initiatives and understanding how difficult amending the constitution is in non-DCI states can help explain the current state constitutional status of same-sex marriage. These institutional attributes have explanatory power because they establish the voter and legislative support thresholds that constitutional change requires. In this section, we examine those thresholds more explicitly, integrate them with our polling data, and use the combination to offer an improved explanation of the current constitutional status of same sex marriage. To pass an amendment, a procedural requirement and an Election Day requirement must be satisfied simultaneously. By procedural requirement, we mean the percentage of votes in each chamber of a state's legislature that is required to place a potential amendment on the ballot. By Election Day requirement, we mean the percentage of voters whose formal assent is required to pass a potential amendment.
Since citizens in a DCI state can place a constitutional amendment on a ballot directly, legislators in DCI states do not cast a formal vote. Hence, the procedural requirement in DCI states is "zero." Moreover, the typical DCI state Election Day requirement is a simple majority.
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With respect to both requirements, there is more variation across non-DCI states. Table 2 lists detailed requirements for these states.
[ are two assumptions about these preferences that we can make using data from other sources.
First, we assume that where the constitutional status of same-sex marriage is contested on partisan grounds, Republican legislators will support placing restrictive constitutional amendments on the ballot. Preservation of traditional definitions of marriage is, for many social conservatives, a vitally important issue. As social conservatives are a core component of Republican Party supporters across the country, we expect Republican state legislators to support ballot access for restrictive amendments.
Our second assumption, about Democratic state legislators, is more nuanced. While both of the major parties have colorful histories and while members of neither party are in complete agreement about all issues, the most prominent within-party split of the last 100 years is between southern and non-Southern Democrats. We expect non-southern Democrats to oppose placing restrictive amendments on the ballot and we expect southern Democrats to support such placements.
Two votes in the US Congress, taken ten years apart, are the main evidence we present in support of these two assumptions. The first vote occurred in 1996, when Congress voted on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). This act allows states to disregard same-sex marriages granted by other states and prevents the federal government from recognizing such marriages.
The bill passed by margins of 85-14 in the Senate and 342-67 in the House. Ten years later, a constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage was introduced in the House (HJ RES 88) and the Senate (SJ RES 1). In the Senate, a motion to consider the bill was killed by a party line vote. In the House, the resolution failed by a vote of To be sure, ours is a crude assumption that is certainly false in important cases. 13 We know of Republicans and southern Democrats who have opposed constitutional restrictions against same-sex marriage and we know of non-Southern Democrats who support restrictions.
However, given the evidence that we have reviewed, the assumption works as a simple and relatively accurate representation of how various legislators tend react to proposals that would affect the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.
To generate a set of expectations about the constitutional status of same-sex marriage in non-DCI states, we integrate the procedural information from each state with the poll data from earlier in the paper, the legislative preferences assumption just stated, and data on the partisan makeup of non-DCI state legislators. 14 We do this for every state and every year from 1997 to 2008. If a state ever satisfied both the election day and legislative thresholds in a single year (or if it satisfied these requirements in consecutive years as some complex non-DCI states require), then our expectation is that the state will have a constitutional amendment. Table 3 documents these expectations.
[ This is twenty percentage points higher than the success rate of the "amendments follow to pass the bill, we focused on the partisan breakdown of both houses of the legislature from 1997 to 2008. As we could not precisely estimate how public opinion would translate to outcomes where state policy required that an amendment must obtain majority of all votes cast to pass, we simply considered whether or not a simple majority of citizens opposed same-sex marriage. 15 The numbers in both the numerator (states predicted correctly) and the denominator (total states in study) reflect the availability of poll data. Recall that there are three states -Delaware, Mississippi and West Virginia for which we have no polls. The fact that Delaware and West Virginia never meet the legislative requirements necessary to begin the amendment process is sufficient for us generate an expectation: we expect no amendment in these states. However, the fact that we do not have public opinion for these two states they are excluded from Figure 4 . Mississippi's legislature, on the other hand, does meet the legislative requirement. Since Mississippi's Election Day requirement is a simple majority in support of changing the constitution, If we had a poll showing majority support for a constitutional restriction (and it is worth noting that the 2004 constitutional ballot measure banning same-sex marriage in Mississippi passed with over 86% of the vote), our expectation would be that Mississippi would have one. But we have no such data for Mississippi. Hence, we exclude it from this part of the analysis. 16 Our results in this section are a product of the polling data described earlier in the paper. It is reasonable to ask about the extent to which our results are sensitive to other plausible measures of state-level attitudes on same-sex marriage. Lax and Phillips (2009) have generated such estimates using a very rigorous approach that includes multilevel regression and poststratification. Relying on a dataset of 26 national polls conducted between 1996 and 2005, they model individual responses as a function of demographic characteristics and state of residence. Next, the authors conduct a poststratification where estimates for each respondent type are weighted by the percentage of each respondent type in actual state populations. This produces state-level estimates of public opinion on same-sex marriage. This work constitutes an important substantive advance. We replicated our analysis using Lax and Phillips's (2009) measures of public opinion instead of our own. There are no states for which the Lax and Phillips estimates improve our original explanation. In fact, using their data yields different predictions in two cases: Iowa and Indiana.
attitudes" hypothesis and twelve percentage points higher than the "amendments follow procedures" hypothesis.
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Of course, one could argue that because we have used an assumption about legislative preferences to derive this revised estimate, attitudes have found their way back into the explanation. To the extent that attitudes lead voters to choose some legislators rather than others, it is certainly true that such attitudes help to produce the explanatory improvement of our approach. But any such effect is indirect and necessarily limited by the fact that voters choose state legislators for a wide range of reasons -only one (at most) of which is the legislator's view on the constitutional status of same-sex marriage. Put in more general terms, our argument is not that attitudes are irrelevant to the pattern of constitutional amendments on same-sex marriage.
Our argument is that explaining why state constitutions differ in their treatment of same sex marriage requires more than just information about voter attitudes. It also requires knowledge of the institutions that define relevant legislative and voter support thresholds. In both cases, using our data with our model yields the correct prediction but using our model with the Lax and Phillips estimates yield the wrong prediction. A likely cause of this difference is that while we base our state-level estimates on fewer polls than Lax and Phillips, the polls we use are newer. The national trend towards permissiveness in attitudes towards same-sex marriage may explain why our measure produces less public opposition to same-sex marriage in those states. 17 In Appendix 2, we examine the seven states for which our estimations were incorrect. A summary of that appendix is as follows. In Alaska and Kansas, a small number of democrats voting contrary to the broad assumptions of this section were sufficient to render our expectation incorrect. In Wyoming and Pennsylvania, there have been enough Republican defections from amendment proposals to block ballot access. In North Carolina, our expectation was undermined by a significant number of "southern" democrats voting like non-southern democrats. In Kentucky, our expectation was undermined by the opposite being true. Our coding of Hawaii as "incorrect" relies on a technicality. Technically, Hawaii does not have an amendment that literally renders same-sex marriage constitutional, which is what we expect. However, it does have an amendment that yields the same outcome, so we code our expectation as incorrect. [ Figure 4 about Matsusaka's analysis derives important explanatory power from a variable measuring whether or not judges stand for election (also see Besley and Payne 2005) . His argument for this effect is that because the threat of elections should limit exercises of judicial discretion that counter public opinion, policy outcomes are more likely to reflect public opinion when judges are elected. We examined this hypothesis with our data. In 26 of the 37 (70%) judge-election states for which we have polling data, the state constitutional status of same-sex marriage matches state-level attitudes. The same is true in 7 of the 10 (70%) non-election states for which we have data. Hence, in the case we are studying (state constitutional amendments), the election of judges appears to offer no explanatory improvement. This difference in results is likely due to 18 This claim is consistent with findings by scholars such as Donovan (2004), Gerber (1996) , Gerber and Hug (2003), and Matsusaka (2004) , who show how institutional variations such as the magnitude of signature requirements affect the frequency of direct democracy usage. It also complements Haider-Markel (2001) . He argues (2001:5) that the diffusion of same-sex marriage bans across states "is best explained by the presence of an organized national campaign by conservative religious groups, the local resources of interest groups, and other internal state characteristics." Our effort complements his by providing an answer to the question "Why would conservative religious groups organize in some states and not others?" One possibility is that the groups organize where their members are. Another, more strategic, possibility suggested by our work is that these groups believe that the likely policy return on their campaign investments depend on the institutional variables described in our paper. If they combine this information with the kinds of local knowledge that Haider-Markel describes, they could well conclude that their best response is to invest their resources in states where the procedural and Election Day requirements specified above are achievable.
the fact that we focus exclusively on constitutional amendments, while Matsusaka focuses primarily on statutes. As we described in the introduction, judges can overturn statutes that they find to be inconsistent with a state's constitution. But amendments are constitutional by definition. Since an amendment's legality is more difficult, and often impossible, to challenge in state courts, amendments offer less opportunity for the kind of judicial discretion that statutory interpretation can allow (see, e.g., Eskridge 1994 thresholds that form the core of our approach. Given the lack of variance in their dependent variable and the absence of a threshold-based logic in their argument, the lack of statistical significance of their coefficient is not surprising and is an extraordinarily weak indicator of the proposition that political institutions do not affect the relationship between attitudes and policy outcomes. Put another way, focusing on whether or not a state allows initiatives is an important step in explaining attitude-outcome relationship, but stopping there is equivalent to assuming that the additional procedural and election day requirements described earlier in this section are inconsequential. Our results suggest that the thresholds are quite consequential in explaining the current variation in how state constitutions treat same-sex marriages.
The Future of Political Action and the Legality of Same-Sex Marriage
To this point, we have focused on the question of whether a state will come to have a constitutional restriction after not having one. There has not yet been a case where a state reverses a restrictive amendment (by passing a new amendment that is less restrictive). However, many polls suggest that Americans are becoming gradually more tolerant of gay marriage (Franklin 2008 Indeed, this second condition implies that a substantial change in legislative attitudes is required for permissive constitutional shifts. For example, in a state where two-thirds of a legislature is required to place a restrictive amendment on the ballot, two-thirds of the same body will be required to place a permissive amendment on the ballot. Hence, a permissive constitutional shift will require a change in the views of at least one-third of the legislature.
Barring an unprecedented acceleration of permissive attitude changes amongst Republicans or More generally, our efforts can speak to the general matter of how much opinion change will be needed to change or preserve current constitutional outcomes. For as long as majorities of voters are against treating same-sex marriages the same way as heterosexual marriages, we can expect states that currently have restrictions to keep them. If attitudes were to shift in a permissive direction, constitutional changes could follow. Using the logic stated above, we would expect DCI states to be quickest to react. Given the relatively small number of people required to qualify a proposed amendment for ballot access in DCI states, a small group of advocates paired with enough money to satisfy the signature requirement would have a strong incentive to seize the first possible opportunity to reverse the restriction. Those seeking change in non-DCI states face higher barriers. There, greater legislative and/or voter support is required.
So, compared to other states, the current constitutional outcome is "locked in." In general, those who wish to change or preserve the content of state constitutions will be more effective if they base their strategies on knowledge of the rules by which states convert legislative efforts and mass attitudes into constitutional outcomes.
Before concluding this section on implications, we would like to address a methodological topic that some readers have brought up. To this point in the paper, we have been purposefully conservative in a key aspect of our presentation. We have described our theoretical framework as applying to the constitutional status of same-sex marriage across states. That said, we recognize that the basic methodological distinction we are making is more broadly applicable. Specifically, our method has been to highlight a contrast between an approach to explaining policy outcomes that focuses on attitudes only and an approach that self-consciously incorporates institutional attributes into the logical structure of the analysis. As a general matter, we share the view that attempts to integrate attitudinal and institutional factors are of high potential value for political science. We see this effort as a modest step in that direction.
Conclusion
US state constitutions differ widely in their legal treatment of same sex couples. While
Americans surely do differ in how they feel about this topic, state-level variations in such attitudes are insufficient to explain contemporary constitutional outcomes. Better explanations come from integrating this information with knowledge of the institutions that convert public sentiment into constitutional change.
Appendix 1. Public Opinion Sources
Notes: As most of these polls were obtained using newspaper articles, exact question wording is not available in all cases as not all newspapers published full questions. Error is in percentage points. 
Kentucky:
Our expectation is that Kentucky would not have a constitutional amendment as it is considered a non-Southern state and over the past 10 years Republicans have always been a minority in the lower house. In 2004, Senate Bill 245 proposed amending the constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage. The bill passed the House on April 12 by a vote of 85-11 and passed the Senate on April 13 by a vote of 33-5. Given that at the time there were 16 Democrats in the Senate and 63 (a majority) Democrats in the House, these votes suggest that the bill was supported by a majority of Kentucky Democrats. Hence, our expectation for Kentucky fails because Kentucky Democrats have acted differently than most non-Southern Democrats. Indeed, from the pattern of legislative votes on this bill, Kentucky resembles a southern state.
North Carolina:
Since North Carolina is a southern state and since a majority of voters are opposed to same-sex marriage, our expectation is that it would have a constitutional restriction. While there is no constitutional restriction in the state, North Carolina passed a statutory ban on same-sex marriages in 1996. Since 1996, the North Carolina legislature has never seen a Republican majority in the Senate, and has been almost evenly split between Republicans and Democrats in the House. At various times in recent years, legislative proposals for a restrictive constitutional amendment have surfaced, but these attempts have been blocked by Democratic legislators (Beckwith 2008) . Hence, our expectation for North Carolina fails because North Carolina Democrats have acted differently than most other Southern Democrats.
Pennsylvania:
Our expectation is that Pennsylvania would have a restrictive constitutional amendment given polling data on voter attitudes, the fact that legislative majorities in consecutive sessions are sufficient to place a potential amendment on the ballot, and the fact that Republicans controlled both legislative chambers over multiple legislative sessions. Pennsylvania does prohibit same sex marriage at the statutory level. It adopted DOMA as state law in 1996.
The closest that Pennsylvania came to placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot was in 2006. In that year, the state Assembly passed a vote to place a restriction on the ballot by a vote of 136-61. The Senate then passed a similar bill by a 38-12 vote. Nearly all Republicans in both legislative chambers supported the bills. While this Republican support was sufficient to pass the bills, the wide margins are the result of a significant number of Democrats in each chamber also supporting the bills. With these outcomes in hand, the process ground to a halt. The House and Senate bills were not identical. The Senate's bill did not prohibit civil unions and domestic partnerships. In subsequent months, the House and Senate were not able to reconcile their differences. Soon, thereafter, Republicans lost majority control of the Assembly. Efforts to place a restrictive amendment on the ballot, while discussed, have not again progressed as far as they did in 2006.
Wyoming:
Our expectation is that Wyoming would have a constitutional restriction. Wyoming is one of a handful of states that had a statute restricting marriage in Wyoming to a man and a woman prior to DOMA. Changing the constitution requires assent by two-thirds of each legislative chamber and support of a majority of all voters voting in an election. Since 1998, however, Republicans have retained strong majorities (70% or more) in both of Wyoming's houses. Given that Wyoming has long had substantial Republican majorities in both chambers of its state legislature and polls that suggest substantial support for a constitutional restriction, our expectation is that Wyoming would have one. But Wyoming, which calls itself "The Equality State," has not pursued such an amendment. We do not have a good explanation for this outcome; though it has been pointed out to us that the Wyoming legislature has extremely short legislative sessions and that religion-based conservative interest groups are not as powerful in Wyoming as elsewhere. That said, in early 2009, a number of socially conservative groups from other states, such as Focus on the Family, have concentrated their efforts on Wyoming in an attempt to have a constitutional restriction passed. 
